a mong the most salient issues in contemporary politics is how immigration affects the social and economic life of receiving countries. Such consequences include welfare state policies and income redistribution to address economic inequalities. policymakers, media commentators, and scholars have debated how and whether immigration affects social, economic, and political relations shaping welfare and tax systems.
1 on the one hand, immigration might undermine social solidarity or the altruistic willingness to help others that prevails in a country, or it might increase the costs of redistribution efforts-all in ways that undermine public support for redistribution.
2 on the other hand, such exposure to immigration poses individual economic risks to income or employment that might, in turn, increase support for redistribution and welfare protection to indemnify against such risks. 3 empirical studies support both of these views and have suggested that immigration's implications might be mediated by host-country attitudes toward immigration or concerns about the economic consequences of immigration.
4 the jury remains out about the net effects of immigration on redistribution and about which social and economic conditions in host societies might mediate such effects. this study seeks to clarify the relationship between immigration and social policy by exploring how social and economic integration of immigrants in host societies mediates that relationship. observable aspects of such integration-particularly, the degree to which immigrants are similar to natives in their unemployment levels, the level of dependence on the welfare state, and social attitudes-should influence how immigration affects redistributive politics. this article argues that these aspects of integration influence how immigration affects solidarity and/ or imposes fiscal and macroeconomic pressures, and to a lesser degree they also alter the way that immigration increases individual economic insecurities. the resulting hypotheses proposed here are simple: higher immigration should more negatively affect support for government redistribution to the extent that immigrants have higher rates of unemployment than natives, are more dependent than natives on social benefits, or do not share the native population's sociocultural values.
the article tests these arguments empirically using five waves of european Social Survey data on individual attitudes in twenty-two european polities between 2002 and 2010. the focus is on whether the considerable variation across these countries and years in foreign-born stocks as a share of the population influences support for redistribution and welfare states in ways that are conditional upon gaps between immigrants and natives with respect to unemployment rates, socialbenefit dependency, and sociocultural values. estimating these gaps using the survey and other data sources reveals considerable variation in economic and sociocultural nonintegration that cannot be reduced to differences in the origins of immigrants.
the analysis reveals that exposure to higher foreign-born percentages tends to diminish support for redistribution and social protection but also that this effect is substantively and statistically significantly more negative when migrants have proportionately higher unemployment rates and greater dependency on social benefits. In contrast, the gap between foreign-born and native respondents in sociocultural values has a more modest and less consistent negative effect on the relationship between immigration and redistribution. further analysis reveals that these patterns likely involve worries about the fiscal viability of social policy: thus, economic nonintegration with respect to unemployment and social-benefit dependency, though not with respect to sociocultural values, exacerbates how immigration increases individual concerns about fiscal costs of social protection without altering the attitudes of citizens of the host country toward altruism or economic insecurity. the patterns suggest, in short, that economic integration, more than sociocultural integration, may be an important factor in dampening immigration's negative effects on welfare states in europe.
i. immigration's offsetting and uncertain implications for government redistribution
When people from abroad settle in another country to live and work, the effects can reshape a host-country's politics of redistribution and the welfare state. existing research suggests that immigration can have offsetting implications for such politics, in some ways increasing and in other ways decreasing support for redistribution. the best-known results involve broad economic and social implications of immigration that spell bad news for generous redistribution and welfare states. the economic implications are principally fiscal in nature. Immigrants to european countries tend to be less educated and to perform more poorly than the native population on standardized tests. 5 they also tend to find employment in those sectors that are hit hardest by unemployment during cyclical downturns. 6 With the added possibility of discrimination, it comes as little surprise that foreign-born residents often have significantly lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than their native counterparts: foreign-born unemployment rates averaged 8.5 percent as compared with 5.3 percent for natives in oecd countries in 2008. 7 Immigrants are also thought to use disproportionately more social policy programs and contribute little to the revenue base as compared with natives, fostering a common view that they are a net fiscal burden. 8 In reality, immigrants often rely less on contributory transfers and services, such as pension programs financed largely through payroll taxes. However, because immigrants tend to have more children, to be less wealthy, and to be more likely to be unemployed and for longer, they also usually rely more than do natives on noncontributory government services and welfare programs-such as social assistance, housing benefits, and public schooling. 9 according to one recent estimate pooling the experiences of nine eu countries, migrants are 20 percent more likely to rely on such benefits. 10 as for net tax contributions, europe's migrants often pay lower shares of total revenue than their native counterparts. boeri calculates that, for nine countries surveyed, migrants pay 368 w o r l d p o li t i c s on average only 57 percent of the level proportional to their population share.
11 estimates of immigration's net fiscal burden vary widely, but most studies identify a modest net burden for european countries (mostly less than 1 percent of average national gdp).
12
In any event, pluralities of european polities surveyed consider immigrants to contribute less in taxes than they receive in social benefits (47.3 percent) and judge immigration to be bad for the economy as a whole (38.6 percent). 13 Several studies on support for immigration have found that respondents in countries or regions with more generous redistributive policies are more hostile to immigration, as compared with those that have less generous policies, a pattern thought to reflect the fiscal burden of immigration (a burden not accompanying other facets of globalization, such as trade).
14 the reality or belief that immigrants pose net fiscal burdens, particularly with respect to social-policy benefits, can be expected to make european publics facing higher immigration see government redistribution as more economically costly. Hence, immigration can lower support for redistribution out of concern for the higher net fiscal costs of immigration.
Separate from such fiscal calculations, immigration has social implications that might also lower support for redistribution. polities facing more immigration may experience social fragmentation and less social interaction, even among their own ethnic peers. Such patterns inform some research findings that immigration, particularly when ethnic heterogeneity is introduced, may lower solidarity, trust, and social capital among the population more generally-though this is now a matter of fierce theoretical and empirical debate. 15 to the extent that immigration really is bad news for solidarity, rising immigration could diminish support for government redistribution, since a unanimous body of scholarship has shown that trust and solidarity are significantly positively related to support for social policy and redistribution. Hooghe et al. 2008; Kymlicka and banting 2006; gijsberts, van der meer, and dagevos 2012; and mcLaren 2012. 16 See Habyarimana et al. 2006; van oorschot and uunk 2007; and alesina and glaeser 2004. i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 369 protections than are other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, those with disabilities, or the unemployed. 17 rising immigration therefore increases the "less deserving" proportion of the population pool, in turn diminishing support for social protection and redistribution. all these economic and social channels combine to suggest that immigration may be a force for retrenchment of social-policy protection and redistribution-therefore giving rise to what has been called a "progressive's dilemma." 18 the channels spelling bad news for government redistribution, however, are not the whole story. Studies of political economy have long articulated ways in which immigration might spur rather than stall public support for redistribution. the Stolper-Samuelson or specific-factor ricardo-Viner models expect factor-price equalization to result from migration as well as from goods and capital, because it does not matter for such equalization whether trade moves jobs to people or whether immigration moves people to jobs. both should yield a convergence of wages and working conditions between the "sending" and "receiving" labor markets. In most european countries where the "scarce factor" is unskilled and semiskilled workers, higher immigration, particularly of less-skilled migrants, can lower wages and working conditions and raise risks of unemployment and income loss, particularly among less-skilled natives. Such changes can unleash stronger interest in redistribution to indemnify against such risks, particularly among less-skilled workers.
19 furthermore, immigration may also increase the elasticity of labor supply and demand, regardless of the factor-profiles of sending and receiving countries. Such elasticity can increase income and employment insecurities beyond particular skill categories in host countries. Immigration may, here again, increase insecurities that spur interest in and support for redistribution and welfare states.
these individual economic implications could also aggregate to create inequalities and social exclusion that publics recognize as problems in need of mitigation or compensation. Such collective risks might provoke sociotropic concern and support for social-policy protections and redistribution. 20 In short, immigration might heighten collective or individual insecurities in a way that boosts rather than reduces the political sustainability of redistribution. as an empirical matter, most studies have revealed the net relationship between immigration and support for, or actual, social-policy protection or redistribution to be modestly negative. Soroka, banting, and Johnston, for instance, find evidence at the level of country-years that higher foreign-born proportions decrease growth in social-policy spending. 21 alesina and glaeser find cross-sectional survey evidence that ethnic heterogeneity correlates negatively with support for redistribution. 22 mau and burkhardt find similar survey evidence that european countries with higher foreign-born proportions, particularly non-Western proportions, are modestly less supportive of redistribution. 23 Senik, Stichnoth, and van der Straeten identify similarly modest negative effects in cross-sectional patterns.
24 Some of these studies have directed attention to the offsetting links between immigration and redistribution, suggesting that background conditions might mediate immigration's effects-conditions such as welfare state types, anti-immigrant attitudes, or concern about the economic effects of immigration.
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However, none of these or other studies has articulated how immigration's effects on redistributive politics might be mediated by the social and economic integration of immigrants. this is an important silence, for two reasons. first, a number of the above arguments about how immigration either undermines or promotes support for redistribution rest upon conditions related to integration-where integration patterns are treated as constants, even though they clearly vary across countries and time. for instance, immigration might pressure altruism or fiscal health only to the extent that immigrants are not integrated into labor markets or assimilated into the cultural mores of host societies. and that "extent" varies across countries and time, as some studies of immigration have already observed. 26 Second, the role of integration in welfare politics is prominently discussed in real politics and mass media, suggesting that integration is salient enough to influence the way ordinary citizens think about immigration and welfare states. discussions of immigration, integration, and welfare policies are particularly common in european settings. 21 Senik, Stichnoth, and var der Straeten 2009 . and on the mediating effects of a country's labor-market integration into eu labor markets, see Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011. 26 See, for instance, Causa and Jean 2006; dustman 1996; favell 2003; bagley 1971; and brubaker 2001. i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 371 for instance, the danish minister for employment and minister of finance, Claus Hjort frederiksen, proclaimed, based on his department's rough estimates, that "if immigration from third World countries were blocked, 75 per cent of the cuts necessary to maintain the welfare state would be unnecessary." 27 and in 2009 Kai pöntinen of the finnish national Coalition party stirred up controversy with his campaign speeches and television advertisements touting the slogan: "Stop Welfare-bum Immigration."
28 Statements like these in media and political debate make it more likely that public attitudes about welfare policies and redistribution will be influenced by immigration and migrant integration.
the relevant understudied and salient interaction between immigration and integration raises important questions about the future of welfare states. might greater migrant integration or assimilation help sustain public support for redistribution and social assistance in the face of immigration? might the possibly negative implications of immigration for the welfare state-the "progressive's dilemma"-be confined to polities where immigrants are poorly integrated socially or economically? might the effects of immigration be more strongly mediated by some aspects of integration than others, such as by economic more than by sociocultural integration?
ii. argument: How integration mediates tHe redistributive politics of immigration answering such questions requires clarifying immigrant integration and its implications for redistributive politics. doing so fully is a taller order than this article can fill, given the many subtle and contingent dimensions associated with integration. Scholars disagree strongly on which aspects of social, economic, and political relations or which differences between immigrants and native populations matter for either integration and/or assimilation. 29 amidst such controversy and complexity, however, it is possible to identify commonly discussed and observable aspects of immigrant integration and assimilation and to identify their implications for redistributive politics. the intuitively important aspects are economic and sociocultural integration patterns relevant to the three channels discussed above that plausibly link immigration to support for social policy and redistribution: economic insecurities, fiscal pressures, and solidarity/altruism. I focus on patterns seen in three aspects of integration-specified here as the opposite, "nonintegration"-that emerge from the economic and sociocultural characteristics of immigrants and natives.
30 the first two are relevant to economic nonintegration of immigrants. one, the gap between foreign-born unemployment and native-born unemployment, captures the degree to which the foreign-born population is successful in the labor market relative to the native population. a second important gap is that between foreign-born and native dependency on social benefits-capturing more downstream dependence on the fiscal purse. a third gap, separate from economic integration, involves sociocultural integration or assimilation, that is, the gap between foreign-born and native populations in their respective attitudes about gender relations, religion, political values, and social standards. these three gaps, or aspects of "nonintegration," can be expected to vary across countries and time, as they reflect both the attributes and the origins of immigrants themselves and also labor-market and integration policies in host countries. 31 all three gaps between foreign-born and native populations can be expected to have important implications for redistributive politics. they may affect redistributive politics directly, though whether this is so is unclear, as poor integration of immigrants is less relevant in places with few immigrants to integrate. What is clearer is that each aspect of nonintegration can alter the channels discussed above by which immigration can either undermine or undergird support for redistribution.
I argue that all three gaps between migrants and natives, while differing from one another in their implications, can be expected to intensify immigration's negative effects on redistribution more than its positive effects. figure 1 summarizes these arguments, where the three aspects of nonintegration have distinct implications relevant to the politics of redistribution: the gap in unemployment should have implications captured by 1a, 1b, and 1C (combining how each of the arrows a, b, and C emerge from "1. gap in unemployment"); the gap in social-policy dependency by 2a, 2b, and 2C; and the gap in sociocultural values by 3a, 3b, and 3C. these implications involve the gaps in unemployment, in social-benefit dependency, and in social values amplifying in different 30 for the sake of clarity, the remaining discussion speaks in terms of "integration." 31 Causa and Jean 2006. i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 373 ways immigration's tendency to undermine solidarity and/or raise macroeconomic costs of redistribution that lower support for redistribution, but not amplifying immigration's tendency to raise those economic insecurities that nourish support for redistribution. Such implications are themselves empirically testable, but they culminate in what I want to emphasize most: three hypotheses on how each gap mediates immigration's net effects on support for government redistribution. gap in unemployment If immigrants have higher unemployment than their native counterparts, immigration may spark concerns in a polity about collective risks, as gaps in unemployment manifest inequalities and social exclusion in labor-market experience. given this possibility, any mediating role played by this aspect of nonintegration may intensify any tendency of immigration to raise sociotropic concern about collective inequalitiesthereby stimulating support for redistribution. Such a pattern is captured in figure 1 by a positive sign for the mediating role of nonintegration with respect to unemployment, given by arrow 1a. nevertheless, a gap in unemployment has unclear implications for individual economic insecurities: natives facing more immigration amidst such labor-market gaps are unlikely to experience more job or income risks. Hence, figure 1's arrow 1a can be labeled "Ø."
Economic Insecurity
Concern about own or others' poverty, Job-Loss, Inequality by contrast, unemployment gaps can be expected to alter how immigration affects fiscal costs and solidarity/altruism and thereby support for redistribution (arrows 1b and 1C, respectively, in figure 1). Higher immigrant unemployment means that rising immigration likely lowers the tax base and increases reliance on social benefits. Such a situation can affect perceptions of the fiscal cost of social benefits, regardless of the general level of unemployment. Conversely, where foreign-born unemployment is lower than native unemployment, natives could see immigration as making marginally positive contributions to productivity and the fiscal sustainability of redistribution. Such logic thus suggests a strong positive mediation between immigration and unemployment gaps in shaping actual or perceived macroeconomic costs of redistribution (a positive sign for arrow 1b in figure 1) . finally, the lack of labor-market integration captured by a large unemployment gap could diminish native feelings of solidarity and welfare deservingness for those struggling in labor markets. Hence, gaps in unemployment should intensify any negative effect that immigration has on solidarity and altruism, thereby diminishing support for redistribution (captured by the negative sign for arrow 1C in figure  1 ). these putative links underlie the first hypothesis, as follows:
Macroeconomic Costs
-Hypothesis 1 (H1). gaps in unemployment (for example, higher unemployment rates than natives) should enhance the degree to which immigration decreases, and/or diminish the degree to which immigration increases, native support for government redistribution.
gap in social-benefit dependency the end result should be similar for nonintegration of immigrants with respect to disproportionate reliance on social benefits. Such reliance could stem, in part, from a gap in unemployment but also from lower inactivity (for example, fewer homemakers), higher reliance on child allowances, or sickness and disability, or other sources of take-up rates or welfare dependency. or it could reflect variations in discrimination and in immigrants' access in different social-policy settings.
32 gaps in socialbenefit dependency, in any event, should have more modest implications for individual and collective economic insecurities than that hypothesized to emerge from gaps in unemployment, because the former signals that society is doing something to address immigration-related inequality or social exclusion. Hence, gaps in social-benefit dependency ought not to alter how immigration affects support for redistribution via individual or collective insecurities (null sign for arrow 2a). 32 Sainsbury 2006; ruhs 2008; engelen 2003. i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 375 by contrast, a gap in social-benefit dependency might, more than the gap in unemployment, enhance the extent to which immigration lowers solidarity or altruism among natives and in turn native support for redistribution (an equally negative sign for arrow 2C). even more clearly, gaps in social-benefit dependency directly capture fiscal pressure on the spending side (and presumably also lower tax contributions). Hence, gaps in social-benefit dependency ought to more significantly and directly increase fiscal pressure resulting from higher immigration-more so than unemployment gaps do (a more positive arrow 2b). these considerations support the second hypothesis.
-Hypothesis 2 (H2). gaps in social-benefit dependency (for example, foreign-born being more dependent on social benefits than natives) should enhance the degree to which immigration decreases, and/or diminish the degree to which immigration increases, native support for government redistribution.
gap in social values more clearly than is the case for economic aspects of nonintegration, the more social aspects of nonintegration, such as gaps in or clashes of cultural values held by immigrant and native populations, can intensify the degree to which immigration diminishes solidarity or altruism. Where immigration introduces alien and different values than those held by the host population, it likely undermines social unity and solidarism. of course, as the literature on "culture clash" makes clear, this is a complicated matter, depending on, among other things, which aspects of social values one addresses. 33 However, substantial gaps with respect to values on any or all social, cultural, or political issues should intensify immigration's negative effect on solidarity (negative sign for 3C). by contrast, gaps in social values can be expected to have few implications for how immigration affects either individual or collective risks or for fiscal costs of redistribution (3a and 3b, respectively). Hence, gaps in values should make immigration more negatively or less positively influence redistribution support.
-Hypothesis 3 (H3). gaps in social values of foreign-born population relative to native (for example, different attitudes about religion, gender relations, sexuality, and so on) should enhance the degree to which immigration decreases, and/or diminish the degree to which immigration increases, native support for government redistribution.
w o r l d p o li t i c s
In sum, the arguments culminate in three principal hypotheses that larger gaps between immigrants and natives in unemployment (H1), in social-benefit dependency (H2), and/or in social values (H3) ought to make the effects of immigration on support for redistribution more negative or less positive than when such gaps are smaller. to be clear, these hypotheses are related but separate, since the three gaps do not always hang together-for instance, economic nonintegration may well swing free of cultural nonintegration-and since the three aspects of nonintegration should have distinct implications for how societies respond to immigration. Looking across the three principal hypotheses, we can explore which aspect of nonintegration is particularly important in shaping how immigration plays out for redistributive politics, an issue that I treat as an empirical question rather than a theoretical one. the nine intervening conditions that each hypothesis implicates, summarized in figure 1, are testable subhypotheses. gaps in unemployment and social-policy dependency, for example, might interact with immigration to influence, in particular, perceived fiscal costs of social benefits (captured by 1b and 2b in figure 1) but not to influence either economic insecurities (1a and 2a) or solidarity/altruism (1C and 2C). and gaps in sociocultural values might interact with immigration to particularly influence social altruism or solidarity (3C in figure 1 ) but not to influence economic insecurity or perceived fiscal costs of social policy (3a or 3b).
iii. survey evidence in europe I test these various expectations on time-series cross-sectional data of individual attitudes in twenty-two countries in europe, combining the five existing waves of the european Social Survey (ess).
34 the data set encompasses between two and five survey waves for seventeen West european advanced democracies (austria, belgium, denmark, finland, france, germany, greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, netherlands, norway, portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the united Kingdom) and five Central and east european countries (Czech republic, estonia, Hungary, poland, and Slovakia). this yields a combined sample of some 160,000 respondents. the data set is particularly suitable for testing the above arguments, because it includes substantial national and individual variation in support of government redistribution and provides a basis for identifying variation in national-level 34 ess 2011; ess 2012. i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 377 exposure to immigration over a substantial cross-section of countries and a meaningful period of time. these provide substantial leverage for exploring the above arguments. dependent variables the ess directly surveys what I seek to explain: public support for government redistribution and welfare protection. respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "government should reduce differences in income."
35 I recoded the answers to create measures of support for government redistribution. the baseline is an ordinal measure Support Redistribution (ordinal) ranging from 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat disagree, somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree). 36 this question about government redistribution is the only social-policy question in all waves of the ess. How such redistribution ought to be accomplished is left unstated in the survey. government redistribution reflects combinations of more or less progressive taxation and various income transfers or social services (for example, job training). I presume that respondents answering the redistribution question might have these policy provisions in mind but might also consider only the broad principle of redistribution evoked by the question. the sample mean of Support redistribution (ordinal) is 3.86 in 2010 (a modest rise from the 2002 average of 3.76), suggesting that most europeans support redistribution on the 1-5 scale. 37 to give a better idea of the variation over time and space, figure 2 summarizes the national sample means (weighted for sampling but not population) for Strongly support redistribution (binary) in 2002 and 2010. the grand mean is .27, suggesting that substantial minorities of european publics strongly support redistribution. but the averages vary substantially, from a low of .08 in denmark in 2002 to a high of .57 in Hungary in 2010. Such a distribution reminds us that support for government redistribution is likely influenced, at least partly, by existing levels of inequality and/or actual redistribution. the overtime developments in these data suggest substantial changes in support for redistribution, averaging out as a modest rise (3.9 percentage points between these two years), though, again, the pattern varies across 35 ess 4-2008 appendix a3, Q.b30, 26. 36 for both versions of the measure, "don't know or refused" were coded as missing (including less than 0.5 percent of the sample).
37 Summary statistics for this and all other variables on the full sample are provided in table a1 of the appendix. 378 w o r l d p o li t i c s countries: whereas, for instance, france and norway experienced substantial drops in support, germany and most east european countries experienced increases. more generally, respondents in the five east european countries are more supportive of redistribution (for example, .34 compared with .26 for the West european polities), though proportionately they have not risen more than their West european counterparts.
In robustness tests I consider other specifications of support for redistribution and welfare provision, for example, binary specifications, such as Strongly support redistribution (binary) (1=strongly agree; 0=strongly or somewhat disagree, or neither agree nor disagree, or somewhat agree). and I consider questions asked about social spending and taxes or about unemployment protection from the 2008 ess wave.
independent variables the principal explanatory variable is the most reliable and crossnationally valid measure of international immigration for the sample countries, Foreign-born % population.
38 this measure is preferable to alternative measures such as asylum seekers, immigration flows, noncitizens, or net migration, because it better captures actual stocks of immigrants in a given country and year and is less sensitive to annually and 38 oecd 2009; oecd 2010; oecd 2012a. n o r w a y g e r m a n y g r e e c e f r a n c e S lo v a k i a I r e la n d I t a l y S p a i n 
i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 379 nationally varying differences in measurement of such. 39 the downside of this measure is that it is available only since 2000, precluding study before the 2000-2010 years relevant to ess data. figure 3 summarizes the national values in 2001 and 2009 (to capture a one-year lag relevant to ess 2002 and 2010, respectively), revealing significant variation in the european sample (Italy is not measured for both years): from just over 2 percent for poland in 2001 to nearly 37 percent for Luxembourg in 2009. We also see substantial increases over this relatively modest period-more than 50 percent increases in finland, greece, Ireland, norway, Spain, and Slovakia, and averaging 43 percent (of 3.2 percentage points) across the sample, with portugal being the only exception.
equally central are the integration measures emphasized in hypotheses 1-3. I focus on three measures, as close to the concepts in the hypotheses as existing data allow. a snapshot of all three is provided by figure 4. the first integration measure is the simplest, having been measured well across time and space in oecd countries: Gap in unemployment, the ratio of foreign-born unemployment to native unemployment.
40 the leftmost bars in figure 4 capture the country means for all five one-year lags used in the analysis (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009) . by this measure, we see that in all but two countries the ratio is higher than one; that is, the foreign-born population has higher unemployment than natives. the ratio is highest in belgium, the netherlands, and Switzerland, whose foreign-born populations are more than two-and-a-half times more likely to be unemployed than their native counterparts. the exceptions are Hungary and Italy, where natives are more likely to be unemployed than their foreign-born counterparts. these averages mask substantial variation over the sample years, however, with several countries having lower than one-to-one ratios in at least one year in the panel.
more difficult to measure is the social-benefit dependency of the foreign-born versus native-born population. It is difficult to gauge due to the lack of systematic measurement across a significant number of european countries and years in take-up rates of welfare provisions, which can vary a lot across different aspects of social policy.
to get an approximate measure of such dependency, I use the leverage provided by the ess data set itself, with its large, high-quality sampling properties, by estimating the likelihood that foreign-born respondents 39 Lemaitre 2005; oecd 2012a. It is also preferable to a related but more encompassing measure, foreign-born or children of foreign-born, because the measure is most relevant to actual immigration, as opposed to diversity debates and because the measure used of foreign-born stocks is more nationally comparable across more countries and years.
40 oecd 2010; oecd 2012b.
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w o r l d p o li t i c s rely on nonpension social benefits for their income. Such estimation is based on answers to a standard question in the ess panel on income sources, including the possibilities of "unemployment or redundancy benefits" and other "government social benefits" but leaving out explicitly mentioned "pension benefits." based on these answers, I construct the individual-level measure of incidence of (nonpension) Social-benefit dependency (1=income mainly from unemployment/redundancy benefit or other social benefits; 0=other sources of income). then, using probit models, I estimate the marginal likelihood that a respondent's being foreign-born (1=born abroad; 0=born in country of residence) predicts that respondents rely on social benefits for their income (that is, Socialbenefit dependency=1), net of education, age, and gender of respondents. the results provide the basis for the country-year-specific integration measure Gap in social-benefit dependence: z-statistic of the marginal effect (∂f/∂x) that being foreign-born predicts social-benefit dependency. the middle bars in figure 4 summarize the resulting country means across the five survey waves. these estimates correlate highly with studies of social benefits based on larger samples but for smaller crosssections of countries and years.
41 they also correlate positively with Gap in unemployment (nation-year sample r-square is .29 and coefficient of correlation of 0.54). but because social-benefit dependence reflects many other conditions-such as varying social-policy systems granting varying accessibility to immigrants-there are outliers, such as 41 See boeri 2010. the resulting measures are also not sensitive to no or more controls in the model specifications and estimators used to generate country-year specific social-benefit dependency of foreign-born respondents. 
Hungary or denmark. as measured, in any event, Gap in social-benefit dependency is lowest in the Czech republic and Hungary and highest in Switzerland and germany. most difficult to measure are cultural features of nonintegration, the broad social attitudes or values of foreign-born versus native populations relevant to nonintegration into host societies. existing scholarship differs on which subdimensions matter to such assimilation, and in any event we lack good cross-national and temporal measures of any of these dimensions.
42 my approach is again to use the leverage provided by the ess data, focusing on respondent answers to several questions tapping into key social values. the ess includes a number of salient questions across all ess waves and sample countries: (1) belief that gays should be free to live as they wish; (2) belief that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce; (3) belief in the importance of religion; (4) figure 4 are country means of that Gap for the five years of the sample. the cross-national distribution is different from the economic aspects of integration. this is illustrated by how Hungary, estonia, and portugal score very high in the Gap in social values and low in terms of the economic-related Gaps. Indeed, there is no statistically significant relationship between Gap in social values and the other two measures, a pattern that comports with research suggesting that economic position does not strongly predict social integration of migrants.
44
It is worth emphasizing that the above measures of economic and social nonintegration are unlikely to be mere artifacts of national backgrounds of immigrants. the three measures correlate weakly with nonWestern immigrant shares (more specifically, shares of those born in Latin america, asia, or africa).
45 figure a1 in the appendix gives an overview or this relationship, where the correlation involving Gap in unemployment is insignificantly positive, while that involving Gap in sociocultural values is not even positive.
as controls, I consider individual and nation-year parameters that plausibly influence both support for redistribution and immigration. Age can be expected to affect pension-related and other economic interests in and values toward redistribution. Female gender captures occupational selection and has been found to spur support for social policy interventions. Education affects occupational selection and conditions whether respondents are likely to be net beneficiaries or benefactors of redistribution. Household income has direct implications for work choices and for redistribution and, as a possible consequence of immigration patterns, will tend to lead us to understate implications of the latter for i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 383 attitudes on redistribution. Married respondents have income sources and responsibilities affecting work choices and social-policy attitudes. Employed captures labor-market vulnerability and taste for redistribution. Elementary occupation measures manual, unskilled work orientation of respondents. Union member captures organizational interest that affects redistributive attitudes. Satisfied with national government is satisfaction with the central government's functioning, to capture general subjective quality of governance and confidence in the quality of government's tax, spending, and other policies. I also consider crucial national-level controls: Existing redistribution (the difference between post-transfer-post-tax gini index and market gini index), to control for taxes and social spending policies already in place to redress market inequalities; 46 and Unemployment rate, the standardized percentage of total unemployment in the population year, relevant to economic demand and supply of redistribution, as well as to possible attraction of immigrants.
47 beyond these controls, I also consider in robustness tests alternative individual and national-year controls, such as existing inequality levels and social-policy spending. 48 estimation strategy to explore the three hypotheses, I fit models of Support for redistribution among the native population, taking account of both individual variation across respondents in country-years and country-year variation in the integration and immigration measures. Ignoring the multilevel nature of such data violates the assumption of independent errors and can lead to underestimation of standard errors associated with contextual variables.
49 therefore, I fit random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with nationally varying intercepts, distinctly estimated variances and covariances, and robust standard errors (clustered by country). the models take the following form: 48 the panel character of the survey creates room for inclusion in multilevel models of a couple of country-year controls in addition to the foreign-born and gap measures. on the sensitivity of such issues, particularly in single wave models, see Van der meer, te grotenhuis, and pelzer 2010. 49 Steenbergen and Jones 2002.
w o r l d p o li t i c s most important are the effects of Foreign-born percent conditional upon the nonintegration measures (that is, Gap in unemployment, Gap in social-benefit dependency, or Gap in social values)
, with these parameters and their interactions estimated in separate models due to limited degrees-of-freedom for country-year variables of interest. I report models with the full controls described above, plus year dummies. 50 In addition to these baseline models, I explore sensitivity and robustness tests, as well as the intervening conditions plausibly underlying how immigration and integration interact to shape support for redistribution.
iv. results and discussion discussion of the results can be divided into three subsections. the first two focus on testing the main hypotheses 1-3, first with respect to a baseline specification and then with respect to robustness and sensitivity checks. a final subsection then explores the links putatively underlying these hypotheses using a separate series of estimations on the relevant subsample of data.
baseline effects on support for redistribution table 1 summarizes the baseline results focused on Support redistribution. the first model considers how foreign-born percentage influences Support for redistribution directly, and the remaining models consider how this influence is mediated by measures of nonintegration between foreign-born and native populations. as for the controls, respondents who are older, female, in elementary occupation, and union members are more supportive of government redistribution than their counterparts. and more educated, wealthier, married, and employed respondents, and those satisfied with the national government tend to be less supportive of redistribution. as for country-year controls, neither the national-level unemployment rate nor existing redistribution is significant, net of foreign-born shares. Leaving our key independent variable out of the estimates (models not shown), unemployment tends to spur support for redistribution, suggesting that macroeconomic downturns inspire redistributive tastes, while ex ante redistribution weakly reduces such support, consistent with the possibility of diminishing marginal returns to redistributive effort. Year dummies (included but not shown) are positively signed and significant, particularly from 2008 to 2010- (categorical) . respondent answers to the question "government should reduce differences in income" (answers recoded to 1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree).
multilevel random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with variances and covariances distinctly estimated, and with robust standard errors (clustered by country). dummies for years included but not shown. most importantly, the baseline results provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2, with little support for hypothesis 3. model 1 shows the direct effects of Foreign-born percentage, ignoring the possible role of nonintegration: immigration statistically significantly diminishes support for redistribution, and in this panel setting somewhat more strongly so than in previous studies focused on fewer countries and single waves of ess data.
51 models 2-4, then, directly test hypotheses 1-3, respectively, suggesting that the economic nonintegration measures particularly diminish the degree to which Foreign-born percent has a negative effect. this can be seen by the significant interaction terms in model 2 for interaction with Gap in unemployment (hypothesis 1); and in model 3 for interaction with Gap in social-benefit dependency (hypothesis 2). In model 4 we see that the interaction with Gap in social values (hypothesis 3) is significant only at the p<0.1 level, just under conventional standards of significance.
the substantive meaning of these interactions cannot be read off of the table, however, since the coefficients for Foreign-born percent are conditional, showing the effect where the nonintegration measure is zero-a value outside the sample range for either Gap in unemployment or Gap in sociocultural values, and in the middle of the distribution for Gap in social-benefit dependency. the significant positive component coefficients for the three Gaps are also conditional upon Foreign-born percent being zero, the coefficients becoming significantly less so as exposure to immigration rises. In separate models (not shown), none of the nonintegration measures (Gap in unemployment, Gap in social-benefit dependency, or Gap in sociocultural values) has significant direct effects (negative or positive) on support for redistribution. the key issue for the present analysis is to clarify what such interactions mean for redistribution support.
Simulations based on the reported models reveal the point in the distribution of the nonintegration measures where Foreign-born percent becomes significantly negative (see figure a2 of the appendix): that point is reached when the Gap in unemployment is above 1.3 at roughly the 25th percentile of the sample distribution; when the Gap in socialbenefit dependency reaches .8, also at roughly the 25th percentile of the distribution; and it applies throughout the distribution of Gap in sociocultural values. this translates into empirical findings that immigration significantly undermines support for redistribution, except when economic integration is high (that is, except in the lowest quartiles of nonintegration with respect to gaps in unemployment or in social-benefit dependency).
figure 5 graphically captures the conditional effects of immigration: the substantive effects of varying Foreign-born percent where gaps between foreign-born and native respondents are low (at the 10th percentile) compared with such effects where gaps are high (90th percentile), holding the other parameters at their means or medians. the results shown are based on the baseline models using the categorical measure Support redistribution (from strongly oppose=1 to strongly support=5), but the pictures are very similar using results from multilevel logit models reported below. the scales of the axes, measuring the predicted Support for redistribution and Foreign-born percent, are the same for each panel, allowing direct comparison of the effects of different faces of nonintegration.
Where the Gap in unemployment is low (figure 5, upper-left panel), at the 10th percentile (1.07 ratio of foreign-born to native unemployment), increases in Foreign-born percent do not significantly decrease support for redistribution (as can be seen by the slopes of the schedules for the lower and upper confidence intervals). Where the Gap in unemployment is high, however, the full range of Foreign-born percent (from the 1st to the 99th percentile in the sample distribution) predicts a drop in Support redistribution from 4.49 to 2.2-what can be seen as a shift from a predicted attitude that is between somewhat and strongly supporting government redistribution to an attitude that is somewhat opposed to redistribution. the predicted results are more modest for the scale of increases in foreign-born shares that most countries have actually experienced-something easier to visualize with reference to shifts from the 50th to the 90th percentile (captured by the broken vertical lines in each panel). the results are substantively more modest for Gap in social-benefit dependency (right-hand panel) and Gap in social values (lower left panel). It is important also to put such results in perspective by recognizing that in settings where nonintegration is high and Foreign-born percent is low (below 7.6 percent of the population), the predicted support for redistribution is higher or about the same as when nonintegration is low and Foreign-born percent is low. It is particularly at higher exposure to immigration that we see nonintegration making such exposure take a bite out of support for redistribution.
In all cases, however, rises in Foreign-born percent where foreignborn populations are not well integrated in host societies predict sub- 
stantively meaningful declines in support for redistribution. but where foreign-born populations are well integrated with respect to Gap in unemployment and Gap in social-benefit dependency, this negative effect is no longer statistically insignificant. table 1's results are further corroborated by many alternative specifications. Some of these are close to those just discussed and need only brief mention. for instance, including all measures of nonintegration and their interactions with foreign-born together in a single estimation yields very similar results, though it poses high collinearity (vif scores above 37 for some parameters and an average vif score of 6.1). and one can also generate composites of the standardized values of the gaps in unemployment, social-benefit dependency, and sociocultural values. doing so yields results corroborating those in table 1. In fact, the size and significance of the interaction term is greater than the baseline results for either Gap in unemployment or Gap in social-benefit dependency, suggesting that different aspects of nonintegration might well have cumulative effects. 52 the baseline specification from table 1 also harbors interesting information about subsamples of countries, though small subsamples can lack the degrees of freedom to investigate the effects of interactions between country-year immigration and nonintegration.
53 the results are particularly strong in support of hypotheses 1 and 2 among the sample's seventeen West european countries and are similar if one restricts the sample to the eu15 or even to just the Southern european countries (greece, Italy, Spain, and portugal). In the subsample of countries experiencing the largest increases in foreign-born shares-for instance, the six experiencing more than 50 percent increases between 2002 and 2010-nonintegration again has a negative but substantively more modest role in mediating the effect of foreign-born shares on support for redistribution. most noteworthy, perhaps, is how immigration has played out in the five east european countries, where Foreign-born percent has positive rather than negative direct effects on support for redistribution. economic nonintegration in these settings dampens the effects of immigration, as in the full sample or West european subsamples, but this entails dampening the tendency of immigration to spur support for redistribution. In the east european states immigration 390 w o r l d p o li t i c s may not be as bad news for redistribution support as it is in their seventeen West european counterparts. In short, although such small subsamples lack the degrees of freedom to confidently gauge how immigration and nonintegration interact, they suggest differences in how immigration plays out for redistribution while revealing patterns that corroborate table 1's baseline support for hypotheses 1 and 2.
alternative specifications of support for redistribution more challenging and important sensitivity and robustness tests are summarized in tables 2 and 3. models 1-4 in table 2 show that the patterns of interaction discussed above are robust to an alternative specification of the dependent variable, particularly Strongly support redistribution (binary), where 1=strongly agree that government should reduce income differences and 0=otherwise. this specification captures strong variation across the national samples and time, as summarized in figure 2 above. these entail random-intercept maximum-likelihood logit estimation (to conserve space, I include but do not report full controls). Such models confront the discrete character of the survey question, though of course at the expense of the full nuance of the categorical measure above.
54 the results are in line with those reported in table 1, corroborating hypotheses 1 and 2, but here also hypothesis 3. Foreign-born percent tends to have significantly negative direct effect, but also to be negatively conditional upon Gaps in unemployment, in social-benefit dependency, and in sociocultural values. the mediating effects of nonintegration are, in fact, stronger than in the baseline, even though Foreign-born percent, here, significantly diminishes support for redistribution even where nonintegration is low. for instance, based on model 2, when Gap in unemployment is at the 10th percentile (ratio of 1.06), the sample variation in Foreign-born predicts a drop from a 29 to 10 percent chance of supporting redistribution. but where that Gap is at the 90th percentile (ratio of 2.69), the same variation in Foreign-born predicts a drop from 49 to 2 percent-substantively a much stronger diminishing effect of immigration in this binary specification. models 5-8 in table 2 summarize results for a specification involving a key alternative measure of immigration: DForeign-born percentage, the two-year differences (between survey waves) in foreign-born percent, rather than levels. this specification gauges the influence of a politically (binary) . respondent answers to question "government should reduce differences in income" (answers recoded to 1=strongly agree; 0=somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree). multilevel random-intercept maximum-likelihood logit models grouped by country, with variances and covariances distinctly estimated. Controls and dummies for years included as in ing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services, which should they do?" (respondent answers recoded as 0=government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services; 10=government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services). b dependent variable: Government should help unemployed: "government should ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed." (respondent answers recoded as 0=Should not be government's responsibility at all; 10=Should be entirely government's responsibility). multilevel random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with variances and covariances distinctly estimated. Controls same as in table 1, except exclusion of unemployment rates and redistribution (all results for controls not shown).
i m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 393 salient measure of exposure to immigration-recent shifts in immigration exposure-and focuses attention on the over-time variation in the data. the model is in other respects the same as in the baseline models in table 1 (to conserve space, I present only the main results of interest). the results are again in line with the baseline, clearly supporting hypotheses 1 and 2 but not hypothesis 3. as a direct effect, DForeignborn percentage has no significant dampening effect (though the coefficient is negatively signed). Like the baseline models, however, the two measures of economic nonintegration-Gap in unemployment and Gap in social-benefit dependence-significantly push the effect of DForeignborn percentage downward, in the direction of diminishing support for redistribution. In fact, such mediating effects are again stronger than in the baseline models. Simulations like those in the appendix, figure a2, but for DForeign-born percentage, suggest that the mediating effect of Gap in unemployment is strongest: DForeign-born percentage is positively signed until Gap in unemployment gets above 1 (the 17th percentile), and significantly negative after the 35th percentile in that Gap (a ratio of 1.44). 55 table 3 focuses on two measures of support for welfare provision, as opposed to government redistribution. both measures are drawn from the 2008 wave of the ess (based on questions unfortunately not asked in other waves). the first of these, analyzed in models 1-4 of table 3, is Government social spending and taxes: respondent answers to whether government, if it had to choose, should choose "increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services" (answers ranging from 0-10, 0=decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and 10=increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services). the second measure, analyzed in models 5-8 of table 3, is Government should help the unemployed, based on answers to whether "government should ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed" (answers ranging from 0=should not be government's responsibility at all to 10=should be entirely government's responsibility).
the models in table 3 are based on the same specifications as in table 1, except that here the focus, by necessity, is on only one wave of the ess; hence, there is no time dimension and there are fewer countries and in turn no further country-level controls or year dummies. Hence, the results command less confidence than those affording higher degrees of freedom. but table 3's models focus on substantive support 394 w o r l d p o li t i c s for social policy directly. and we see from the results a pattern clearly in line with those in the baseline models of table 1. Here, exposure to Foreign-born percent does not have significant direct effects, but those effects are strongly mediated by gaps between foreign-born and native unemployment and social-benefit dependence. for instance, up until roughly the 10th percentile of Gap in unemployment, higher Foreignborn percent significantly increases support for higher social benefits and taxes; but at roughly the 75th percentile of Gap in unemployment the effects of Foreign-born percent are significant and negative. this constitutes clear corroboration of the principal findings from the baseline models: measures of economic nonintegration, more than sociocultural nonintegration, negatively mediate the effects of immigration on support for social policy as well as redistribution.
all these reported results stand up to a range of further robustness and sensitivity tests. the results are very similar if one considers fewer or other mixes of controls (including social spending and extant inequality), removes outliers in any of the key variables, or in a jackknife analysis removes any single country or year of the panel. and the results are robust to alternative measures of nonintegration (based on additional questions, such as on political values) or alternative measures of immigration (for example, noncitizens, asylum seekers, net migration). they are also robust to alternative estimators, such as ordered probit or logit or multinomial logit models. In short, substantial evidence in surveys of european publics points to the conclusion that economic nonintegration increases immigration's broad tendency to dampen support for generous redistribution and social protection. effects on economic insecurity, macroeconomic costs, and altruism further empirical exploration of the above arguments is possible, however, by looking into the intervening links underlying hypotheses 1-3, as discussed above: that different kinds of nonintegration might in various ways make immigration more likely to increase worries about macroeconomic/fiscal costs of social policy and to decrease feelings of solidarity or altruism, but it should do less to increase immigration's implications for natives' economic risks (see figure 1) . although most waves of the ess data offer few questions to examine these links, the 2008 wave of the ess data does include three questions relevant to them. the questions are the basis of models summarized in table 4. relevant to respondent economic insecurities (corresponding to arrows 1a, 2a, and 3a in figure 1) is Poverty risk, based on a question about figure 1 's arrows 1a, 2a, 3a): "during the next 12 months how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities? (answers recoded to 1=not at all likely; 2=not very likely; 3=Likely; 4=Very likely). b Social benefits strain economy (relevant to figure 1's 1b, 2b, 3b): "Social benefits/services put too great a strain on the economy" (answers recoded to 1=strongly disagree; 2=somewhat agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=somewhat agree; 5=strongly agree). c Altruism (relevant to figure 1's 1C, 2C, 3C): "It is very important to me to help the people around me. I want to help care for their wellbeing" (answers recoded to 1=not like me at all; 2=not like me; 3=a little like me; 4=Like me; 5=Very much like me). multilevel random-intercept maximum-likelihood models grouped by country, with variances and covariances distinctly estimated, and with robust standard errors (clustered by country). Controls same as in table 1, except exclusion of unemployment rates and redistribution (all results for controls not shown).
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w o r l d p o li t i c s the risk of poverty: "during the next 12 months how likely is it that there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities?" (answers ranging from 1-4, 1=not at all likely, 4=very likely). relevant to concerns about macroeconomic costs of social policy (corresponding to arrows 1b, 2b, and 3b in figure 1) is Social benefits strain the economy, based on the question whether "social benefits and services put too great a strain on the economy" (answers ranging from 1-5, recoded as 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). and relevant to respondent attitudes about altruism and solidarity (corresponding to arrows 1C, 2C, and 3C in figure 1) is Altruism, based on whether respondents believe "it is very important to me to help the people around me. I want to help care for their wellbeing" (answers ranging from 1-5, 1=not at all like me to 5=very much like me). to be sure, these questions do not fully capture sentiments on individual or collective economic insecurity, macroeconomic costs, or altruism and solidarity. but they directly gauge key aspects of such sentiments given as the key intervening variables in figure 1 connecting immigration to support for redistribution. In any event, each of these parameters very strongly influences, consistent with the arguments above and with the findings in other survey work, measures of support for redistribution and welfare policy: as the arguments summarized in figure 1 expected, Altruism and Poverty risk strongly and significantly positively spur support for redistribution and welfare, while Social benefits strain economy strongly and significantly reduces such support (see supplementary material, table a2). 56 the issue addressed in table 4 is whether these same three parameters are influenced by the interaction between measures of immigration and nonintegration. the table summarizes multilevel random-intercept models of Poverty risk (models 1-3), Social benefits strain economy (models 4-6), and Altruism (models 7-9), using in other respects the same specifications as in table 3 (only the main results are shown). the expectations developed above involve the interaction, not direct effects, of Foreign-born population and the three measures of nonintegration. first, all nonintegration measures ought not to have strong mediating effects on how Foreign-born percent affects Poverty risk, expectations summarized above in figure 1 , recall, as 1a, 2a, and 3a. Second, particularly the economic nonintegration measures ought to significantly positively mediate the degree to which Foreign-born percent increases belief that Social benefits strain the economy-arrows 1b and 2b but not so much 3b. all the nonintegration measures, finally, might significantly nega-tively mediate the degree to which Foreign-born percent decreases belief in Altruism-arrows 1C, 2C, and especially 3C.
the results corroborate particularly the economic-oriented expectations. models 1-3 reveal that none of the measures of nonintegration mediates the influence of Foreign-born percent on Poverty risk, consistent with expectation. models 4-6 reveal, also consistent with expectation, that the two measures of economic nonintegration-Gap in unemployment and Gap in social-benefit dependence-significantly increase the degree to which Foreign-born percent increases belief that Social benefits strain economy. and we see that the Gap in sociocultural values, as expected, has little such mediating effect. models 7-9, however, reveal patterns less consistent with expectation: none of the measures of nonintegration significantly mediates the influence of Foreign-born percent on Altruism. It is, hence, mainly measures of economic nonintegration, not sociocultural nonintegration, that appear to matter for support for redistribution and welfare states. and it appears that such economic nonintegration matters via a particular mechanism: by making immigration heighten concern about the broad economic viability of social policy and redistribution, not so much by exacerbating any negative effects immigration may have on altruism or positive effects it may have on individual economic insecurity. further evidence that perceived economic burdens might be important mechanisms are that inclusion of Social benefits strain economy in estimates of support for redistribution or welfare states significantly reduces the coefficients and raises standard errors of interactions discussed in tables 1-4. 57 Hence, the patterns in table 4 provide further support for hypotheses 1 and 2 and modest evidence to reject hypothesis 3: economic nonintegration is more relevant to welfare state politics than is sociocultural nonintegration, and the mechanism by which this is so involves concerns about fiscal costs. as with the main results on support for redistribution, these supplemental results hold for a wide range of alternative estimators and specifications of economic insecurity, fiscal concerns, and altruism. v. conclusion this article has explored how the economic and social integration of immigrant populations can strongly mediate the way immigration in-w o r l d p o li t i c s fluences politics of redistribution and the welfare state. In light of the theoretical reasons to expect immigration to have offsetting implications for such politics, the analysis herein has articulated how and why different measures of social and economic nonintegration of immigrants might alter tastes for redistribution. the analysis suggests that economic nonintegration (captured by Gap in unemployment and Gap in social-benefit dependency), more than sociocultural measures of nonintegration (Gap in sociocultural values), exacerbates the negative effects of immigration on support for redistribution and welfare states. and it clarifies important mechanisms for such effects: economic nonintegration, again more than cultural nonintegration, exacerbates how immigration can spark concerns about the fiscal viability of welfare states, while doing little to alter how immigration affects altruism or individual economic risks.
Such analysis, to be sure, only begins to explore how integration and immigration interact in the politics of redistribution and the welfare state. more should be done to explore how other, perhaps better measures of integration influence redistribution politics, given the complexity of social and economic integration of immigrants. and much more should be done to consider the upstream conditions plausibly influencing levels of integration-net of and beyond the broad characteristics of immigrant populations themselves. for instance, a fruitful line of inquiry would explore how different integration policies and regulations of european states alter the way immigration plays out in redistribution politics. finally, an important extension of this research agenda is to consider how and whether broad public attitudes putatively shaped by immigration, as well as the interaction between immigration and integration, actually influence party and policy-making agendas and ultimate revenue and spending policies of states. all of such further research will require deepening the kind of quantitative-inferential research pursued here, but it will also require in-depth histories of the political economy of particular countries experiencing immigration in the context of ongoing reform of welfare states and redistributive policies.
In the meantime, this study reminds us that national-level measures of immigration can have important implications for social policy and politics, but in ways that are mediated by integration. It may be that national-level measures of immigration undermine the hitherto broad public support for government redistribution, net of a range of individual and national economic and social conditions. but greater economic integration of immigrants into the labor markets can meaningfully diminish such negative effects. greater sociocultural integration or asi m m i g r at i o n , i n t e g r at i o n , r ed i s t r i b u t i o n 399 similation, by contrast, appears to be less important, suggesting that the sociocultural diversity that might accompany immigration may not, as such, threaten the public's acceptance of general social policies. thus, more than cultural convergence, economic integration can help cushion the social-policy implications of immigration in europe and elsewhere. 
